UNIV.  OF  FLUB. 


I     •         iTS  DEFT. 


INTERSTATE 


>0        ^AS  VLS, 


.m  1«  ~: 


1SSI0N. 


REPORT  OF  THE  CHIEF  OF  THE  BUREAU  OF  SAFETY  COVERING 
INVESTIGATION  OF  AN  ACCIDENT  WHICH  OCCURRED  ON  THE 
NORFOLK  &  WESTERN  RAILROAD  AT  WALTON,  VA.,  DECEMBER  18v 
1919. 

January  G,  1920. 
To  the  Commission  : 

On  December  18,  1919,  there  was  a  rear-end  collision  between  two 
passenger  trains  on  the  Norfolk  &  Western  Railroad  at  Walton,  Va.r 
which  resulted  in  the  death  of  5  passengers  and  the  injury  of  10  pas- 
sengers and  7  employees.  After  investigation  of  this  accident  I  re- 
spectfully submit  the  following  report: 

This  accident  occurred  on  the  Radford  division,  which  extends 
from  Roanoke,  Va.,  to  Walton,  Va.,  a  distance  of  41  miles.  At  Wal- 
ton it  divides,  one  double-track  line  extending  to  Bluefield,  W.  Va.., 
and  another  double-track  line  extending  to  Radford,  4|  miles,  beyond 
which  point  it  is  single  track  to  Bristol.  Extending  eastward  from 
"Walton  it  is  a  three-track  -road  for  a  distance  of  about  9  miles  to  the 
top  of  Christiansburg  Hill,  the  track  on  the  south  being  used  for  east- 
bound  passenger  trains,  the  middle  track  for  eastbound  freight 
trains,  and  the  track  on  the  north  for  westbound  movements.  Trains 
are  operated  by  time-table  and  train  orders  and  an  automatic  block 
signal  system.  The  accompanying  diagram  shows  the  approximate 
layout  of  the  tracks  in  this  vicinity,  together  with  various  other 
features  invohred  in  the  accident. 

At  Walton  there  is  a  35-1  ever  electric  interlocking  plant,  all 
switches  and  signals  at  that  point  being  controlled  from  a  tower 
located  in  the  angle  formed  by  the  intersection  of  the  Bluefield  and 
Bristol  lines.  Opposite  this  tower  on  the  south  side  of  the  Bristol 
line  is  interlocking  signal  14-L  governing  eastbound  movements  on 
that  line.  Illustration  No.  1  is  a  view  of  this  signal  looking  eastward. 
At  a  point  759  feet  east  of  this  signal  is  interlocking  signal  8-Lr 
which  protects  the  crossover  switch  connecting  the  middle  track  with 
the  eastbound  main  track.  This  is  a  two-arm,  two-position  lower 
quadrant  signal;  the  top  arm  is  a  semiautomatic  interlocking  signal 
governing  movement  of  trains  from  the  eastbound  track  of  the  Bristol 
line  over  the  eastbound  main  track  east  of  Walton;  the  bottom  arm  is; 
a  calling-on  signal,  controlled  by  the  crossover  switch  and  an  electric 
push  button  or  switch  in  the  tower,  used  as  a  permissive  signal 
for  the  purpose  of  authorizing  trains  to  proceed  with  caution  be- 

161160—20 


2  INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 

yond  the  interlocking  signal  when  the  latter  is  in  the  stop  position 
and  when  the  crossover  switch  is  properly  lined  up  for  an  eastbound 
movement  from  the  Bristol  line.  Illustration  No.  2  shows  signal  8-L 
with  the  calling-on  signal  displaying  a  permissive  indication.  The 
signals  at  this  point  are  electrically  lighted.  The  night  color  indica- 
tions of  these  two  signals  are  as  follows :  Both  signals,  red,  stop ;  top 
signal  red  and  bottom  signal  yellow,  proceed  with  great  caution ;  top 
signal  green  and  bottom  signal  red,  proceed. 

At  the  time  of  the  accident  the  rear  end  of  the  first  train  was 
standing  on  the  eastbound  main  track  at  a  point  about  1,290  feet 
east  of  signal  8-L,  while  water  was  being  taken  at  the  water  tank.  A 
few  hundred  feet  east  of  signal  8-L  is  a  transfer  platform  where 
passengers  are  transferred  between  through  passenger  trains  and  a 
shuttle  train  which  usually  stands  on  the  middle  track.  This  shut- 
tle train  operates  between  Walton  and  Radford,  on  the  Bristol  line. 
At  the  time  of  the  accident  the  shuttle  train  was  on  the  middle  track 
with  the  engine  clear  of  the  crossover  and  the  rear  end  of  the  train 
about  400  feet  west  of  the  rear  end  of  the  train  which  was  taking 
water  on  the  eastbound  main  track. 

Approaching  the  point  of  collision  on  the  Bluefield  line  from  the 
west  there  is  a  6-clegree  curve  to  the  left  1,722  feet  in  length,  this 
curve  coming  to  an  end  a  short  distance  east  of  where  the  double 
track  of  the  Bristol  line  connects  with  the  north  and  middle  tracks 
of  the  three-track  portion  of  the  road  east  of  Walton  tower.  East- 
bound  passenger  trains  after  passing  around  this  curve  then  pass 
through  a  crossover  leading  from  the  middle  track  to  the  eastbound 
main  track.  Approaching  on  the  Bristol  line  from  the  west  there  is 
a  curve  to  the  right  varying  from  4  degrees  to  5  degrees  and  46 
minutes,  the  total  length  of  this  curve  being  slightly  over  1,300  feet. 
This  curve  ends  about  100  feet  east  of  signal  14-L.  Just  west  of  the 
point  where  the  eastbound  track  of  the  Bristol  line  joins  the  east- 
bound  track  of  the  Bluefield  line  and  continues  eastward  as  the 
middle  track,  there  is  a  switch  leading  to  the  eastbound  main  track 
on  the  right  of  the  middle  track.  With  the  exception  of  the 
switches  and  crossovers,  the  track  is  tangent  for  a  distance  of  nearly 
2,000  feet,  from  the  junction  of  the  Bluefield  and  Bristol  lines  to  a 
point  beyond  where  the  collision  occurred.  On  account  of  an  em- 
bankment and  a  building  on  the  inside  of  the  curve  on  the  Bristol 
line  the  view  of  engine  crews  approaching  signals  14-L  and  8-L  is 
restricted  to  about  1,000  feet.  The  grade  is  practically  level  for 
several  thousand  feet.  At  the  time  of  the  accident  the  weather  was 
clear. 

Eastbound  passenger  train  2d  No.  4,  en  route  from  Cincinnati, 
Ohio,  to  Roanoke,  Va.,  consisted  of  6  steel  baggage  cars,  2  steel  sleep- 
ing cars,  and  3  wooden  coaches,  hauled  by  engine  120,  and  was  in 


ACCIDENT  AT   WALTON,   VA.  3 

charge  of  Conductor  Munsey  and  Engineman  Heslep.  It  left  Blue- 
field  at  4.15  p.  m.,  G  hours  and  50  minutes  late,  passed  Walton,  ac- 
cording to  the  block  sheet,  at  6.36  p.  m.,  7  hours  and  15  minutes  late, 
pulled  through  the  crossover  to  the  eastbound  main  track,  and 
stopped  at  the  water  tank  for  water.  The  train  had  been  standing 
at  this  point  about  five  minutes  when  its  rear  end  was  struck  by 
passenger  train  No.  26. 

Eastbound  pasenger  train  No.  26,  en  route  from  Memphis, 
Tenn.,  to  New  York,  N.  Y.,  consisted  of  1  mail  car,  1  combination 
car,  3  sleeping  cars,  1  dining  car,  and  2  coaches,  all  of  steel  construc- 
tion, hauled  by  engine  106,  and  was  in  charge  of  Conductor  Davis 
and  Engineman  Hooper.  It  left  Bristol,  according  to  the  train  sheet, 
at  3.34  p.  m.,  2  hours  and  29  minutes  late,  passed  Walton  at  6.43  p.  m., 
2  hours  and  22  minutes  late,  and  at  about  6.44  p.  m.  collided  with 
the  rear  end  of  train  2d  No.  4  while  traveling  at  a  speed  believed  to 
have  been  about  20  miles  an  hour. 

The  rear  car  of  train  2d  No.  4  was  forced  forward  and  upward, 
telescoping  the  car  ahead  two-thirds  its  length,  the  body  of  that  car 
being  entirely  demolished.  The  body  of  the  rear  car  was  quite 
badly  damaged  and  its  rear  end  was  penetrated  by  engine  106  as 
far  as  the  smokestack  of  the  engine.  The  third  car  from  the  rear  in 
train  2d  No.  4  was  forced  against  the  steel  sleeping  car  ahead  of  it 
and  considerably  damaged.  The  other  cars  in  this  train  were  not 
materially  damaged.  Engine  106  was  not  derailed  and  except  for 
the  front  end  of  the  engine  no  damage  was  sustained  by  any  of  the 
equipment  in  train  No.  26. 

Engineman  Heslep,  of  train  2d  No.  4,  stated  that  after  stopping 
at  Walton  tower  to  receive  a  train  order  he  pulled  ahead  slowly  on 
the  eastbound  track  and  stopped  for  water.  He  then  released  the 
train  brakes  and  kept  the  independent  brakes  applied  on  the  engine. 
He  did  not  sound  the  whistle  signal  for  the  flagman  to  go  back. 
After  taking  water  he  called  in  the  flagman  and  as  he  finished  sound- 
ing the  whistle  he  saw  two  white  lights  about  opposite  the  rear  of 
the  next  to  the  last  car  in  his  train  moving  away  from  the  track 
down  the  embankment,  and  at  the  same  time  the  slack  ran  up  and 
moved  his  engine  ahead  a  distance  of  6  or  8  feet.  This  occurred  after 
his  train  had  been  standing  about  3  or  4  minutes.  He  looked  at  his 
watch  about  40  seconds  afterwards  and  it  was  then  6.44.40  p.  m.  He 
further  stated  that  when  passing  the  shuttle  train  he  did  not  notice 
any  smoke  or  steam  blowing  across  the  track.  He  also  stated  that 
he  had  operated  trains  over  the  Bristol  line  for  several  months  and 
that  with  the  top  arm  at  signal  8-L  displaying  a  red  indication  and  a 
yellow  indication  displayed  by  the  bottom  or  calling-on  arm,  it  meant 
that  the  switches  were  lined  up  but  the  track  was  not  clear,  and  to  pro- 
ceed prepared  to  stop,  no  speed  limit  being  prescribed.     He  con- 


4  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 

sidered  that  the  provisions  of  rule  No.  708  applied  as  to  the  manner 
in  which  the  calling-on  signal  should  be  obeyed. 

Rule  708,  which  is  printed  in  the  rule  book  among  the  manual 
block  rules  reads  as  follows: 

Engineers  anil  conductors  running  on  permissive  block  card  or  permissive 
block  signal  must  handle  their  trains  with  great  caution.  Where  view  is  ob- 
scured, speed  must  be  reduced  to  insure  against  collision  with  a  train  running 
ahead. 

The  responsibility  for  colliding  with  trains  in  block  when  running  on  per- 
missive block  card,  or  permissive  block  signal,  will  rest  with  the  train  receiving 
and  moving  under  such  card  or  signal.  This  will  not  relieve  conductor  and 
engineer  of  train  stopping  in  block  or  between  stations  from  protecting  as  re- 
quired by  rule  99. 

Nothing  in  these  rules  will  relieve  train  and  engine  crews  from  the  fullest 
observance  of  all  the  general  and  special  rules  governing  the  movement  of 
trains. 

Engineman  Heslep  further  stated  that  it  was  not  the  general 
practice  to  protect  by  flag  while  stopping  at  this  point  to  take  water, 
but  that  he  thought  it  should  be  done. 

Fireman  Long,  of  train  2d  No.  4,  said  that  the  slack  ran  up  within 
2  or  3  seconds  after  the  engineman  finished  sounding  the  whistle  call- 
ing in  the  flagman.  He  looked  back  immediately  but  did  not  see  any 
lights.  Fireman  Long  also  said  that  he  had  noticed  quite  a  little 
smoke  and  steam  blowing  across  the  track  from  the  engine  of  the 
shuttle  train,  which  obscured  the  view  to  some  extent. 

Head  Brakeman  Mallory  stated  that  when  the  train  stopped  at 
the  water  tank  he  descended  to  the  ground  from  the  next  to  the  last 
car,  looked  back  and  saw  the  flagman  with  his  red  lantern,  and  then 
started  toward  the  head  end  looking  over  the  train.  He  had  reached 
a  point  about  seven  car  lengths  from  the  rear  of  the  train  when  the 
collision  occurred. 

Conductor  Munsey,  of  train  2d  No.  4,  stated  that  when  his  train 
stopped  at  the  water  tank  at  Walton  he  was  in  the  second  car  from 
the  rear.  He  thought  this  stop  was  made  at  about  G.37  p.  m.  He 
then  walked  back  through  the  train  to  the  rear  in  order  to  see  that 
the  flagman  went  back.  The  door  at  the  rear  of  the  car  being  open, 
he  could  see  the  flagman  going  back,  and  by  the  time  he  reached  the 
rear  platform  the  flagman  was  back  about  6  car  lengths  and  still 
walking  back.  He  remained  on  the  rear  platform  until  train  No.  26 
appeared  around  the  curve  west  of  the  tower.  At  this  time  he  could 
clearly  see  the  train,  his  view  not  being  obscured  by  any  smoke  or 
steam  from  the  engine  of  the  shuttle  train.  He  estimated  the  speed 
of  train  No.  26  when  passing  the  tower  at  about  30  miles  an  hour, 
and  he  thought  then  that  it  was  going  to  collide  with  his  train.  The 
engineman  was  working  steam  and  did  not  shut  off  until  within  10 
car  lengths  of  the  rear  of  train  2d  No.  4.    He  saw  the  flagman  giving 


Fig    L.     Interlocking  signa I  14  L,  governing  easlbound  movements  on  Bristol 
line  at  junction  with  three-track  portion  of  road. 


Fig.  2.     Interlocking  signal  8-L,  which  protects  crossover  switch  connecth 
middle  track  with  eastbound  main  track. 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2012  with  funding  from 

University  of  Florida,  George  A.  Smathers  Libraries  with  support  from  LYRASIS  and  the  Sloan  Foundation 


http://www.archive.org/details/reportofchiefofbOOunit 


\  c,^ 


Not  to   sc&le 
Dotted    ime     iTid/cafes   roafe    of    Trdcn     No  29. 


ACCIDENT   AT    WALTON,    VA.  5 

stop  signals  but  did  not  notice  anyone  signaling  from  the  shuttle 
train.  He  did  not  think  the  brakes  on  train  No.  26  were  applied  until 
after  the  engine  had  passed  the  flagman,  and  was  within  8  car  lengths 
of  his  train.  When  he  saw  that  a  collision  was  inevitable  he  jumped 
from  the  train  and  ran  down  the  embankment  on  the  south  side  of 
tiic  hack.  He  estimated  the  speed  of  train  No.  26  at  the  time  of 
the  collision  to  have  been  20  or  25  miles  an  hour.  After  the  collision 
he  came  up  to  the  engine  of  train  No.  26  and  looked  at  his  watch; 
it  was  then  6.40  p.  m.  He  did  not  know  exactly  how  far  back  the 
flagman  went,  but  thought  he  must  have  been  near  the  end  of  the 
shuttle  train,  a  distance  of  approximately  400  feet.  In  his  opinion 
the  flagman  could  have  gone  back  nearly  to  the  tower  in  three 
minutes.  At  the  time  of  the  collision  he  did  not  have  a  lantern, 
1  laving  previously  loaned  his  own  lantern  to  the  head  brakeman,  and 
he  said  he  did  not  see  anyone  with  lanterns  running  down  the  em- 
bankment. The  markers  on  his  train  were  burning  brightly  and 
were  in  good  condition.  Conductor  Munsey  also  said  that  it  was  his 
practice  when  stopping  for  water  to  see  that  the  flagman  went  back 
to  protect  the  train,  and  also  Avhen  stopping  at  the  transfer  platform 
if  the  stop  was  of  more  than  three  minutes'  duration. 

Flagman  Pyrtle,  of  train  2d  No.  4,  stated  that  when  his  train 
stopped  he  started  back,  walking  slowly,  and  was  about  6  or  8  car 
lengths  from  his  train  when  he  saw  train  No.  26  about  opposite  the 
tower,  at  which  time  its  speed  was  about  45  miles  an  hour  and  the 
engine  working  steam.  At  this  time  he  did  not  notice  any  smoke  or 
-team  from  the  engine  of  the  shuttle  train.  He  also  noticed  that  the 
headlight  on  the  engine  of  train  No.  26  was  dim  and  he  thought  they 
were  using  a  lantern  instead  of  the  electric  headlight.  As  soon  as 
the  train  came  in  sight  he  began  to  give  stop  signals,  continuing 
t<>  give  them  until  he  had  to  jump  from  the  track.  At  this  time  he 
was  about  10  or  12  car  lengths  from  the  rear  of  his  train,  and  he  esti- 
mated the  speed  of  train  No.  26  to  have  been  about  20  or  25  miles 
an  hour.  He  thought  steam  was  shut  off  when  the  engine  was  3  or  4 
ear  lengths  from  him  and  that  the  brakes  were  applied  at  about  the 
time  the  engine  passed  him.  He  was  about  opposite  the  next  to  the 
last  car  in  train  No.  26  when  it  came  to  a  stop  after  the  collision.  He 
stated  that  he  did  not  light  a  fusee  because  train  No.  26  would  have 
passed  him  before  he  could  have  done  so,  and  he  thought  he  could 
do  better  by  signaling  with  his  red  lantern.  Flagman  Pyrtle  also 
stated  that  he  ran  about  a  car  length  back  from  the  track  as  the  train 
passed  him.  When  his  attention  was  called  to  the  fact  that  he  had 
estimated  the  speed  of  train  No.  26  when  it  first  came  in  sight  as  45 
miles  an  hour,  and  that  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  engine  had  been 
working  steam  until  it  was  within  3  or  4  car  lengths  of  him  he  had 
estimated  its  speed  at  that  time  as  20  or  25  miles  an  hour,  he  said  that 


6  INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 

it  could  have  been  reduced  from  45  to  25  miles  an  hour  within  3  or  4 
car  lengths ;  also  that  the  train  might  have  passed  him  at  a  speed  of 
30  miles  an  hour. 

Engineman  Hooper,  of  train  No.  26,  stated  that  after  leaving 
Pulaski,  about  18  miles  west  of  Walton,  he  cut  in  the  electric  head- 
light, found  that  it  was  not  working,  and  had  a  me&sage  dropped  off 
to.  have  a  man  ready  at  East  Radford,  3  miles  west  of  Walton,  to 
make  repairs,  but  on  reaching  that  point  found  that  this  message  had 
not  been  delivered.  In  order  to  avoid  delay,  a  lantern  was  placed  in 
the  headlight  and  the  train  proceeded.  A  clear  indication  was  re- 
ceived at  signal  14-L,  opposite  the  tower,  while  at  the  next  signal, 
8-L,  the  interlocking  signal  was  in  the  stop  position  while  the  calling- 
on  signal  was  displaying  a  yellow  or  permissive  indication.  He  had 
allowed  his  train  to  drift  around  the  curve  at  a  speed  of  about  15 
miles  an  hour,  and  he  stated  that  it  could  not  have  gone  much 
farther  without  working  steam.  Accordingly  as  soon  as  his  engine 
reached  signal  8-L  he  began  to  work  steam,  and  shortly  afterwards 
ran  into  a  bank  of  smoke  and  steam  which  blew  across  the  track 
from  the  engine  of  the  shuttle  train.  This  bank  of  smoke  and  steam 
extended  a  distance  of  about  three  passenger  car  lengths  and  obscured 
his  view  of  the  track  ahead,  but  he  did  not  shut  off  steam.  As  soon 
as  he  had  passed  through  it,  at  which  time  the  speed  of  his  train  had 
been  increased  to  about  20  miles  an  hour,  he  saw  a  red  light,  which 
afterwards  turned  out  to  be  the  right  marker  on  train  2d  No.  4. 
At  this  time  he  had  been  working  steam  for  a  distance  about  equal  to 
the  length  of  his  train.  He  then  leaned  out  of  the  cab  window,  saw 
two  red  lights,  and,  realizing  there  was  a  train  ahead  of  him,  applied 
the  air  brakes  in  emergency.  This  reduced  the  speed  of  his  train  to 
such  an  extent  that  at  first  he  thought  he  would  stop  in  time  to  avoid 
a  collision.  He  thought  the  rear  end  of  train  2d  No.  4  was  about 
four  or  five  passenger  car  lengths  distant  when  he  first  saw  it.  He  also 
stated  that  he  did  not  see  anything  of  the  flagman  either  before  or 
after  the  collision.  His  understanding  of  a  permissive  indication 
at  signal  8-L  was  that  it  gave  him  permission  to  pass  the  interlocking 
signal  under  control,  proceeding  in  that  manner  until  the  next  signal 
was  encountered,  and  that  in  case  of  accident  he  would  be  the  re- 
sponsible party.  He  was  unable  to  say  why  he  failed  to  shut  off 
steam  or  apply  the  brakes  when  he  encountered  the  bank  of  smoke 
and  steam  which  obscured  his  view.  He  thought  that  if  the  head- 
light had  been  burning  he  would  have  been  able  to  see  the  train 
much  sooner  than  he  did.  This  was  his  third  trip  on  train  No.  26, 
and  he  stated  he  had  had  trouble  with  the  electric  lights  on  the  en- 
gine on  each  trip.  He  had  reported  them  on  the  proper  form  and  had 
also  made  a  verbal  report  to  the  foreman  in  an  endeavor  to  have  them 


ACCIDENT   AT   WALTOIST,  VA.  7 

repaired.  On  the  trip  on  which  this  accident  occurred  the  electric 
cab  lights  burned  satisfactorily  until  the  headlight  was  turned  on; 
then  he  found  that  the  headlight  would  not  burn,  while  the  cab  lights 
began  to  flicker  and  from  this  point  to  the  scene  of  the  accident  the 
lights  were  flickering  while  the  train  was  in  motion,  being  totally  ex- 
tinguished at  one  instant  and  then  burning  much  brighter  than  usual 
the  next  instant. 

Fireman  Martin,  of  train  No.  26,  said  that  signal  14-L  was  called 
green  by  the  engineman,  the  next  signal  8-L  being  called  yellow.  He) 
did  not  see  it  himself  on  account  of  looking  out  on  the  left  side  to  see 
the  position  of  the  train  order  board  at  the  tower.  The  speed  of  the 
train  at  this  time  was  about  15  miles  an  hour.  At  some  point  between 
the  tower  and  signal  8-L  the  engineman  began  to  work  steam,  while 
he  went  back  in  the  coal  pit  and  began  to  shovel  down  some  coal.  On 
account  of  working  on  the  coal  he  did  not  know  how  far  the  engine- 
man  worked  steam  or  at  what  speed  the  train  was  moving  when  the 
engineman  applied  the  brakes,  nor  did  he  see  the  flagman  or  the  rear 
end  of  train  2d  No.  4.  His  first  knowledge  of  anything  wrong  was 
when  the  engineman  called  to  him  at  the  time  the  brakes  were  ap- 
plied; the  collision  occurred  before  he  was  able  to  look  out  and  see 
what  was  the  matter.  Fireman  Martin  further  stated  that  his  under- 
standing of  a  yellow  or  permissive  indication  of  the  calling-on  signal 
was  that  it  was  the  same  as  the  yellow  indication  of  an  automatic 
block  signal ;  that  it  meant  that  the  track  was  clear  to  the  next  suc- 
ceeding signal  and  to  approach  that  signal  prepared  to  stop.  He  did 
not  remember  having  previously  received  a  permissive  indication  of 
tliis  signal.  He  had  been  in  engine  service  since  1903,  and  had  been 
an  engineman  since  1912. 

Conductor  Davis,  of  train  No.  26,  stated  that  the  speed  of  his  train 
at  the  interlocking  plant  was  in  the  neighborhood  of  20  miles  an 
hour,  and  he  thought  that  this  had  been  increased  to  about  25  miles 
an  hour  when  the  brakes  were  applied.  At  the  time  of  the  collision 
the  speed  was  about  20  miles  an  hour.  Conductor  Davis  also  stated 
that  it  was  the  practice  to  flag  when  taking  water  at  this  point  and 
also  when  stopping  at  the  transfer  platform  more  than  two  or  three 
minutes. 

Head  Brakeman  Cruise,  of  train  No.  26,  stated  that  he  thought  the 
train  had  been  operated  at  the  usual  rate  of  speed  between  Radford 
and  Walton,  about  25  or  30  miles  an  hour,  and  that  this  speed  was  re- 
duced through  the  interlocking  plant  to  about  15  miles  an  hour.  He 
was  standing  in  the  open  door  of  the  baggage  compartment  of  the 
combination  car  and  he  said  that  the  engineman  began  to  work  steam 
as  the  train  was  passing  signal  14r-L,  the  speed  being  increased  until 
it  was  20  miles  an  hour  at  the  time  of  the  collision. 


8  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 

Rear  Brakeman  Keesee,  of  train  No.  26,  stated  that  the  train  ran  at 
the  usual  rate  of  speed  approaching  Walton  and  that  the  speed  was 
reduced  through  the  interlocking  plant,  being  about  20  miles  an  hour 
when  passing  the  tower.  He  thought  the  speed  at  the  time  of  the 
collision  was  about  25  miles  an  hour.  When  going  back  to  flag  he  did 
not  notice  an}'  smoke  or  steam  from  the  engine  of  the  shuttle  train. 

The  shuttle  train  consisted  of  5  cars,  with  the  engine  on  the 
west  end,  but  headed  east.  Conductor  Wright,  who  was  in  charge  of 
this  train,  stated  that  after  train  2d  No.  4  came  to  a  stop  he  walked 
to  the  rear  of  his  train  to  see  if  there  were  any  passengers  to  be 
picked  up  and  then  returned  to  the  combination  car,  the  third  car 
in  his  train,  and  remained  there  until  he  heard  train  No.  20  ap- 
proaching. He  then  went  out  on  the  car  platform  and  looked  to  see 
if  train  2d  No.  4  had  gone.  He  then  saw  the  flagman  about  4  car 
lengths  from  the  rear  of  train  2d  No.  4  standing  in  the  middle  of  the 
track  giving  stop  signals  with  his  lantern.  Conductor  Wright  stated 
that  he  then  commenced  to  give  stop  signals  from  the  platform  on 
which  he  was  standing,  which  was  on  the  fireman's  side  of  train  No. 
26,  using  his  white  lantern  for  this  purpose.  As  the  engine  passed 
him  he  called  to  the  engine  crew,  and  he  said  that  it  was  about  this 
time  that  the  brakes  were  applied.  He  did  not  pay  much  attention 
to  the  speed  of  train  No.  26,  but  thought  it  was  then  about  25  or 
30  miles  an  hour.  He  did  not  notice  any  smoke  or  steam  blowing 
across  the  track.  Conductor  Wright  further  stated  that  he  operated 
regularly  between  East  Radford  and  Walton,  that  eastbound  pas- 
senger trains  seldom  took  water  at  Walton,  and  that  nearly  always 
they  had  flag  protection  if  they  remained  over  2  or  3  minutes.  His 
understanding  of  a  permissive  indication  of  the  calling-on  signal  was 
that  a  train  should  proceed  prepared  to  find  a  train  occupying  the 
track  ahead. 

Conductor  Moser.  who  was  on  the  shuttle  train,  stated  that  when 
he  heard  train  No.  26  approaching  he  went  out  on  the  car  platform 
and  on  looking  out  saw  the  markers  of  train  2d  No.  4,  but  he  did 
not  see  the  flagman.  He  said  Conductor  Wright  gave  stop  signals 
with  his  lantern  and  that  both  of  them  called  to  the  engine  crew 
as  the  train  passed,  running  at  a  speed  estimated  by  him  to  have  been 
about  15  miles  an  hour.  He  did  not  notice  any  smoke  or  steam  ob- 
scuring his  view  of  train  No.  26  as  it  approached. 

Assistant  Road  Foreman  of  Engines  Blankenship  was  on  the  en- 
gine of  the  shuttle  train  at  the  time  train  No.  26  approached.  He 
heard  the  engine  working  steam  and  thought  that  the  speed  of  the 
train  when  it  passed  him  was  about  35  miles  an  hour.  He  stated 
that  the  brakes  were  applied  as  the  next  to  the  last  car  in  train  No. 
26  was  passing  him  and  that  the  last  car  stopped  about  even  with 
the  east  end  of  the  first  car  in  the  shuttle  train. 


ACCIDENT   AT   WALTON,   VA.  -  9 

Operator  Harman,  on  duty  at  Walton  tower  at  the  time  of  the 

accident,  stated  that  train  2d  No.  4  passed  at  6.36  p.  m.  When  the 
engine  of  train  No.  26  was  passing  the  tower  he  caused  the  calling-on 
signal  to  display  a  permissive  indication.  At  this  time  he  did  not 
know  of  the  location  of  train  2d  No.  4  except  that  it  had  not  passed 
Vieker,  the  next  station  east  of  Walton.  He  was  unable  to  estimate 
Iioav  fast  train  No.  26  was  traveling,  but  stated  that  it  was  Easter  than 
any  passenger  train  he  had  ever  seen  going  through  the  interlocking 
plant,  and  he  thought  that  if  he  had  not  given  a  permissive  indication 
at  the  calling-on  signal  the  train  could  not  have  stopped  without  run- 
i.ing  the  signal.  He  stated  that  he  expected  train  2d  No.  2  to  arrive 
from  Bluelield  very  soon  after  train  No.  26,  probably  10  or  15 
minutes,  and  that  he  considered  he  had  sufficient  reason  for  using  the 
calling-on  signal  not  only  on  account  of  train  2d  No.  2  being  expected, 
but  because  it  was  desired  to  keep  the  interlocking  plant  clear  at  all 
times  on  account  of  the  frequent  movement  of  trains  and  engines 
back  and  forth.  He  said  it  was  customary  to  use  the  calling-on  sig- 
nals at  all  times  and  for  all  purposes,  and  he  considered  it  good  prac- 
tice to  use  them  regardless  of  whether  or  not  some  other  train  was 
due,  and  that  in  this  particular  case  he  did  what  he  ordinarily  would 
have  done  to  advance  train  movements,  the  use  of  the  permissive 
signals  not  being  limited  to  cases  where'  their  use  is  necessary  to 
avoid  congestion.  According  to  his  understanding  these  calling-on 
signals  were  installed  to  keep  traffic  moving  as  well  as  to  reduce  con- 
gestion through  the  limits  of  the  interlocking  plant.  He  also  said 
that  on  two  occasions  he  had  received  protests  from  enginemen  about 
proceeding  beyond  the  stop-and-stay  interlocking  signals  when  in  the 
stop  position,  and  he  had  explained  to  them  the  requirements  of  the 
bulletin  relative  to  the  use  of  the  calling-on  signals. 

Signal  Maintainer  Anthony  stated  that  he  knew  of  two  specific 
cases  in  which  enginemen  had  stopped  at  the  calling-on  signals  at 
Walton  when  they  were  displaying  permissive  indications.  He  also 
stated  that  before  the  calling-on  signal  was  installed  at  signal  8-L, 
when  a  train  was  taking  coal  at  the  coal  wharf  a  following  train, 
on  account  of  not  being  able  to  pass  the  signal,  had  to  stop  on  the 
curve.  In  starting  from  this  location  trains  frequently  were  broken 
in  two.  He  considered  that  the  use  of  the  calling-on  signal  decreased 
the  number  of  shop  cars  from  this  cause  by  75  per  cent.  Even  with 
the  coal  wharf  now  moved  to  Vieker,  an  85-car  freight  train  would 
often  foul  the  track  circuit  for  the  block  east  of  Walton,  controlling 
signal  8-L,  and  thus  necessitate  the  use  of  the  calling-on  signal.  He 
thought  that  this  signal  increased  the  freight  efficiency  of  the  plant 
by  50  per  cent,  meaning  that  where  a  freight  train  formerly  used  15 
minutes  in  clearing  the  plant  it  could  now  do  so  in  7  or  8  minutes. 


10  INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION". 

Signal  Engineer  Richards  stated  that  engines  formerly  took  coal 
at  a  coaling  station  near  the  water  tank  and  that  the  only  way 
helper  engines  could  be  moved  ahead  and  coupled  to  the  rear  of  a 
train  was  by  hand  signals,  the  use  of  which  was  prohibited  in  inter- 
locking plants.  The  rules  also  required  the  engineman  before  pro- 
ceeding beyond  the  signal  to  inform  himself  whether  or  not  the  de- 
rail was  closed.  It  was  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  hand  signals  and 
messages  to  enginemen  that  the  calling-on  signals  at  this  point  were 
installed,  as  well  as  for  the  purpose  of  taking  care  of  passenger  trains 
which  might  have  work  to  do  in  the  block,  as  in  the  case  of  the  shut- 
tle train.  It  was  not  intended,  however,  that  the  calling-on  signals 
should  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  permitting  other  trains  to  enter  the 
block  when  it  was  occupied  except  in  case  of  necessity,  and  unless 
absolutely  necessary  he  did  not  approve  of  the  use  of  the  calling- 
on  signals  except  for  the  purpose  of  advancing  trains  in  order  to 
clear  the  interlocking  plant.  He  thought  it  would  be  safer  if  trains 
were  brought  to  a  stop  before  being  given  a  permissive  indication, 
and  that  this  would  not  result  in  serious  delay  under  normal  traffic 
conditions. 

Assistant  Train  Master  Walker  stated  that  he  examined  appli- 
cants for  employment  in  train  service  as  well  as  brakemen  and  fire- 
men for  promotion  to  the  positions  of  conductor  and  engineman,  and 
that  in  such  examinations  the  operation  of  the  calling-on  signal  was 
taken  up  in  connection  with  the  instruction  in  automatic  and  inter- 
locking signals;  he  thought  it  was  generally  understood  that  it  was 
a  permissive  signal  to  which  rule  708  applies.  He  did  not  know  of 
any  misunderstanding  due  to  the  fact  that  the  signal  is  in  automatic 
territory,  while  rule  708  is  printed  in  the  rule  book  among  the  manual 
block  rules. 

This  accident  was  caused  by  the  failure  of  Engineman  Hooper  of 
train  No.  26  to  operate  his  train  "with  great  caution"  through  the 
block  section  east  of  Walton  as  required  by  the  rules,  after  receiving 
a  permissive  signal  indication.  A  contributing  cause  was  the  failure 
of  Flagman  Pyrtle,  of  train  2d  No.  4,  properly  to  protect  his  train. 

With  interlocking  signal  8-L  displaying  a  stop  indication  Engine- 
man  Hooper  knew  positively  that  the  track  ahead  was  occupied  by  a 
preceding  train  or  obstructed  in  some  other  manner,  and  although 
he  received  a  permissive  indication  of  the  calling-on  arm  at  signal 
8-L,  giving  him  the  right  to  pass  the  interlocking  signal  in  the  stop 
position,  the  only  definite  information  this  permissive  indication 
gave  was  that  the  switches  were  properly  lined  up  for  the  movement 
of  his  train.  It  was  still  necessary  for  him,  as  required  by  rule  708, 
to  proceed  with  great  caution  and  to  watch  out  for  a  train  ahead  or 
some  other  obstruction  which  would  endanger  the  passing  of  his 
train.     Under  such  circumstances  there  can  be  no  excuse  for  his  fail- 


ACCIDENT   AT   WALTON,   VA.  11 

ure  to  have  his  train  under  full  control  at  the  time  of  passing  the 
permissive  signal,  and  while  running  through  the  block  governed  by 
it;  in  any  event  he  should  have  shut  off  steam  and  have  been  pre- 
pared to  stop  quickly  when  running  through  the  smoke  and  steam 
which  he  states  obscured  his  view.  Had  he  done  so,  it  is  probable 
that  he  would  have  been  able  to  stop  his  train  in  time  to  avoid  the 
collision. 

According  to  Flagman  Pyrtle's  own  statement  he  walked  back 
slowly,  and  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  his  train  had  been  standing  about 
five  minutes  before  the  collision  occurred  his  statements  indicate  that 
he  went  back  only  a  distance  of  about  400  feet.  Had  he  utilized  all 
the  time  at  his  disposal  he  could  easily  have  gone  back  as  far  as  sig- 
nal 8-L,  which  would  have  placed  him  beyond  the  smoke  and  steam 
which  Engineman  Hooper  claimed  obscured  his  vision,  and  it  is  prob- 
able that  he  could  have  warned  the  approaching  train  in  time  to  have 
averted  the  collision. 

Engineman  Hooper  was  employed  as  a  section  man  in  July,  1879, 
transferred  to  coaler  in  October  of  the  same  year,  promoted  to  fire- 
man in  1881  and  to  engineman  in  1883.  His  record  was  excellent; 
Flagman  Pyrtle  was  employed  as  a  brakeman  in  January,  1914,  and 
in  October  of  the  same  year  was  disciplined  for  responsibility  in  con- 
nection with  the  derailment  of  an  engine.  His  record  since  that  time 
was  clear. 

At  the  time  of  the  accident  the  crew  of  train  No.  26  had  been  on 
duty  nearly  4  hours,  after  periods  off  duty  of  over  21  hours.  The 
train  crew  of  train  2nd  No.  4  had  been  on  duty  about  12  hours,  after 
nearly  18  hours  off  duty.  The  engine  crew  of  this  train  had  been  on 
duty  about  4  hours,  after  7  hours  and  25  minutes  off  duty. 

In  view  of  the  circumstances  existing  prior  to  this  accident  Oper- 
ator Harman  did  not  exercise  good  judgment  in  allowing  train  No.  26 
to  pass  signal  8-L  when  he  knew  that  the  block  section  east  of  that 
signal  was  still  occupied  by  a  passenger  train,  although  in  doing  so 
he  was  following  a  practice  which  had  grown  up  at  this  point.  In 
January,  1917,  calling-on  arms  installed  on  signals  14-L  and  8-L 
were  placed  in  service  for  the  purpose  of  allowing  permissive  move* 
ments  through  the  interlocking  in  order  to  prevent  delays  due  to  the 
block  sections  being  occupied,  signal  8-L  being  the  last  eastbound 
interlocking  signal.  The  particular  service  intended  to  be  performed 
by  the  calling-on  arm  at  signal  8-L,  according  to  the  officials  of  the 
company,  was  to  enable  helpers  to  advance  and  couple  to  the  rear  of 
trains  without  the  use  of  hand  signals,  and  to  allow  trains  to  close  up 
at  a  coal  wharf  which  was  at  that  time  located  just  east  of  Walton; 
this  coal  wharf  has  since  been  moved  to  another  location. 

The  statements  of  Operator  Harmon,  however,  indicate  that  a 
practice  has  grown  up  of  using  the  calling-on  signal  for  all  pur- 


12  INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 

poses,  even  though  the  train  so  advanced  might  be  so  far  ahead  of  a 
following  train  that  no  delay  to  the  following  train  or  congestion 
of  any  kind  would  result.  It  is  noted  that  such  a  practice  does  not 
give  even  as  much  protection  to  the  train  ahead  as  would  be  afforded 
by  an  automatic  block  signal,  a  stop  indication  of  which,  under  the 
rules  of  this  railway,  requires  the  approaching  train  to  come  to  a 
full  stop  before  proceeding  under  control,  whereas  a  train  receiving 
a  permissive  indication  of  the  calling-on  signal  at  this  point  is  not 
required  to  stop.  While  no  specific  instructions  had  been  issued  to 
operators  regarding  the  use  of  permissive  signals  at  Walton,  it  was 
not  intended  that  this  calling-on  signal  should  be  used  to  advance 
succeeding  through  movements  except  in  case  of  necessity,  and  no 
such  necessity  existed  in  this  case;  the  signal  engineer  stated  that 
unless  such  a  necessity  should  arise  he  would  not  approve  of  its  use 
for  any  purpose  other  than  that  for  which  it  was  installed.  In  view 
of  these  facts,  immediate  steps  should  .be  taken  toward  restricting 
the  use  of  the  calling-on  arm  at  signal  8-L  to  its  original  functions, 
and  it  is  recommended  that  such  instructions  be  issued  as  will  pre- 
vent its  use  to  authorize  the  movement  of  a  passenger  train  past  the 
interlocking  signal  in  stop  position  or  to  authorize  the  movement  of 
any  following  train  past  the  interlocking  signal  in  the  stop  position 
when  the  block  section  east  of  Walton  is  occupied  by  a  passenger 
train,  except  in  case  of  emergency. 

Attention  is  also  called  to  the  fact  that  Fireman  Martin,  of  train 
No.  26,  who  was  a  promoted  man,  stated  that  he  understood  a  yellow 
or  permissive  indication  of  the  calling-on  arm  at  signal  8-L  to  mean 
that  the  track  was  clear  as  far  as  the  next  eastbound  automatic  block 
signal.  Such  an  understanding  not  only  shows  that  he  was  not  fully 
acquainted  with  the  instructions  issued  in  regard  to  this  signal  at 
the  time  the  signal  was  placed  in  service,  but  also  indicates  a  laxity 
upon  the  part  of  those  officials  whose  duty  it  is  to  examine  and  in- 
struct train-service  employees,  to  know  that  they  are  qualified  for 
service,  and  to  know  that  such  rules  are  being  properly  observed  in 
daily  practice.  Immediate  steps  should  also  be  taken  to  see  that  all 
employees  fully  understand  and  live  up  to  the  rules  under  which 
they  are  operating,  for  misunderstandings  of  this  charaecter  upon 
the  part  of  employees  jeopardize  the  safety  of  the  traveling  public. 

It  is  noted  that  the  three  rear  cars  of  train  2d  No.  4,  in  which  the 
casualties  occurred  were  of  wooden  construction;  had  steel  cars  been 
used  instead,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  results  of  this  accident 
would  have  been  far  less  disastrous. 

Respectfully  submitted. 

W.  P.  Borland, 
Chief,  Bureau  of  Safety. 

WASHINGTON  :  GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE  \  1920 


UNIVERSITY  OF  FLORIDA 

IllllllllllllilllilW 

3  1262  08856  1831 


